It is shown with an example that, in bilateral trade problems with two-sided incomplete information, some seller types may obtain higher expected payo¤s in mechanisms other than the one where they make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, contrary to popular belief. If one looks at the mechanism selection problem of the (informed) seller, then the optimality of a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er for the seller is restored. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: C72, C78, D82.
Introduction
Consider private-values bilateral trade problems with two-sided incomplete information. Some economists apparently believe that making a take-it-orleave-it o¤er (hereafter this mechanism is denoted by S) is the "best" incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism for the seller. 1 This belief seems to be based on Riley and Zeckhauser [7] , who showed that S I am grateful to Steve Matthews for pointing out that the example in this note, taken from Yilankaya [10] , may be of some interest. I thank an anonymous referee, an associate editor, Steve Matthews, and especially Eddie Dekel for useful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine. is the seller's optimal mechanism when there is no uncertainty about her valuation. I show with an example that, when the buyer does not know the seller's valuation, some seller types may obtain higher expected payo¤s in other mechanisms. 2 The example may suggest that some seller types will select a mechanism other than S when they can choose the mechanism. However, I show that this is not the case: S is in fact the informed seller's (i.e., the seller knows her type when she selects the mechanism) optimal mechanism. This result complements Riley and Zeckhauser [7] , mentioned above, and Williams' [9] result that S is ex-ante optimal when there is two-sided incomplete information.
The example compares the seller's expected payo¤ in exogenously given mechanisms. The fact that S is the informed seller's optimal mechanism implies that seller types that obtain higher expected payo¤s in mechanisms other than S cannot use this to their advantage. The seller's selection of one of these mechanisms will reveal some information about her type, which in turn, will alter the equilibria in that mechanism to her disadvantage. More speci…cally, in the example, low-valuation seller types do better when shifting from S to a double auction. With incomplete information high-valuation buyers must bid su¢ ciently high to buy from high-valuation sellers, which raises the expected equilibrium price for low-valuation sellers. Thus lowvaluation sellers prefer the double auction. However, when the seller chooses the mechanism, since high types prefer S and separate themselves, the gain to lower types from the double auction is lost, and they will also use S.
The mechanism design problem of the informed principal was …rst studied by Myerson [5] . The setup in this note is similar to that of Maskin and Tirole [3] , who analyze the principal-agent relationship when the principal has private information which does not directly a¤ect the agent's payo¤. They show that the principal generically (in the space of payo¤ functions) does strictly better when she has private information. They also show that when players have quasi-linear utility functions ("the nongeneric case") the principal's utility does not depend on whether or not she has private information. The main result of this note, which also assumes quasi-linear utility, seems to be a special case of this last result: The informed seller's optimal mechanism is S, which is, as Riley and Zeckhauser [7] showed, her optimal mechanism when her valuation is common knowledge. Actually, the analysis of Maskin and Tirole [3] , as general as it is, does not apply to bilateral trade problems. They have many assumptions which are not satis…ed in the standard bargaining environment studied here. For example, they assume that the type space is …nite, the action is continuous, the utility functions of the players are strictly concave in the action, and there exists a feasible action and transfer that both parties prefer to the "null contract". 3 More importantly, their sorting assumption, which is central to their analysis, does not hold. This assumption is used for relating the solution of the principal's mechanism selection problem to the Walrasian equilibria of the …ctitious economy they construct and study. Therefore, their arguments cannot be extended to the setup of this note.
The Best Mechanism for the Seller
There is a seller (i = s) who owns an indivisible good and a buyer (i = b). Let V i be i's valuation (in dollars) of the good, which has a distribution F i with the continuous density f i that is positive over [a i ; b i ]. Both players are risk-neutral. Each player knows her valuation, but considers the other's as a random variable. V s and V b are independent and v i +
Let S denote the mechanism where the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, and D denote the 
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Hence, seller types with v s < c obtain higher expected payo¤s in the 1 2 -double auction than what they would get by making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er.
If the seller's valuation for the good were common knowledge, then S would maximize her payo¤ (Riley and Zeckhauser [7] ). When there is uncertainty about the valuation of the seller, low-valuation seller types obtain higher expected payo¤s in D. In S, the buyer's strategy is independent of the uncertainty in the seller's valuation: the buyer will accept the o¤er i¤ it is lower than her valuation. However, this is not the case in D. In particular, she bids more aggressively if it is more likely that the seller has a high valuation for the good. So, low-valuation sellers bene…t from the positive externality arising from the existence of high-valuation types in D.
Now consider the informed seller's mechanism selection problem. Suppose, only for now, that she has to choose S or D. It is not true that seller types with v s > (<)c will choose S (D). If this were the case, then the seller's choice would reveal some information about her valuation, i.e., whether it is bigger or smaller than c: The buyer would shade her bid, in D, if she were to know that v s < c, rendering the choice of D suboptimal for some seller types with v s < c. More generally, among all feasible mechanisms, all seller types will select a mechanism that is payo¤ equivalent to S:
Proposition 1 Consider the case in which the informed seller selects the trading mechanism (which has to be incentive compatible and individually rational) in the bilateral-trade problem described above. Making a take-it-orleave-it o¤er is optimal for all seller types.
Proof. Due to the principle of inscrutability (Myerson [5] ) there is no loss of generality in assuming that all seller types will choose the same mechanism. 5 Suppose that a seller type obtains an expected payo¤ in this mechanism which is less than what she would obtain from S; then she would select S since the equilibrium in S is insensitive to the belief of the buyer, a contradiction. Hence, all seller types will have payo¤s at least as large as their payo¤s from S. Williams [9] showed the ex-ante optimality of S for the seller. One, then, needs only to show that a seller type getting a higher expected payo¤ than what she would get from S contradicts Williams' [9] result. So, suppose that a seller type (v s ) obtains a higher expected payo¤ than what she would obtain from S. By a continuity argument, for su¢ ciently small > 0; all seller types v s such that, maxf0; v s g < v s < minf1; v s + g will have higher expected payo¤s than what they would obtain from S, as well. However, this contradicts the ex-ante optimality of S for the seller as it was shown that all seller types would obtain payo¤s at least as large as their payo¤s from S.
